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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF NORTH
DAKOTA'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RESULTS IN ITS POSSIBLE
LEGISLATIVE REASSERTION AND LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE
INJURED PARTIES A REMEDY FOR THE TORTS COMMITTED BY
THE STATE OR ITS AGENTS
Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co.,
521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994)
I. FACTS
On December 20, 1991, Lloyd C. Bulman, Jr. was killed when the
pickup he was driving through an unfinished construction project left
the road and rolled.' Bulman's pickup left the road just after passing a
semi-truck and shortly after the point where the road changed from a
hardened surface to loose gravel.2 The Hulstrand Construction Compa-
ny [hereinafter Hulstrand] was the general contractor for the State of
North Dakota [hereinafter The State] conducted construction project
which had been temporarily suspended for the winter. 3 The contract
between Hulstrand and the State provided that the State would be respon-
sible for maintaining the roadway and traffic control devices during
Hulstrand's winter shut down period.4
Judy Ann Bulman, Lloyd's wife, brought suit 5 against Hulstrand
and the State of North Dakota. Bulman claimed that the State negligent-
ly failed to: inspect and maintain the roadway, provide adequate signs
1. Appellant's Brief at 2, Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994) (No.
940047). Bulman had been traveling south on North Dakota Highway 85, south of Amidon, North
Dakota. Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632,633 (N.D. 1994).
2. Appellant's Brief at 2, Bulman (No. 940047).
3. Id.
4. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 640. The contract between the State of North Dakota and Hulstrand
provided:
Temporary Suspension. A temporary suspension of work will not relieve the
Contractor of his responsibility for maintaining and protecting traffic. When operations
are suspended for the winter or are indefinitely suspended by the Engineer for reasons
beyond the Contractor's control, the roadway and the traffic control devices will be
maintained by the Department at its expense.
Before suspending operations for the winter, the Contractor shall construct
adequate approaches to all crossroads or intersecting roads which have been disturbed
by construction operations. He shall provide access to the roadway from abutting
property. Warning signs, barricades, and other traffic control devices shall be erected
(or existing devices removed) as directed by the Engineer.
Id.
5. Appellant's Brief at 1, Bulman (No. 940047). Judy Ann Bulman brought a wrongful death
action on behalf of herself and Lloyd C. Bulman's four surviving daughters pursuant to North
Dakota's Death by Wrongful Act provisions codified in sections 32-21-01 through 32-21-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-21-01 to 06 (1976 & Supp. 1993). The
North Dakota Supreme Court had refused to address the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect
to Judy Ann Bulman's claim on a previous appeal since the entire case had not yet been decided.
Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 503 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1993).
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and warnings, and supervise Hulstrand's work.6 Bulman further claimed
that Hulstrand's liability arose out of its negligence in preparing for the
winter suspension of construction. 7
The district court dismissed the actions against both defendants.8
The district court reasoned that Bulman's action against the State was
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that Hulstrand owed
no duty to Bulman since the roadway was under the control of the State
during the winter suspension period. 9 Bulman appealed both of the
district court's rulings.10
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court ll affirmed the district
court's granting of summary judgment for Hulstrand, but reversed the
dismissal of the claim against the State, and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.12 In doing so, the supreme court held that
the State's sovereign immunity for tort was abrogated.13 This Comment
will focus on the North Dakota Supreme Court's abrogation of sover-
eign immunity and how the North Dakota Legislature has responded.
6. Appellant's Brief at 2, Bulman (No. 940047). Appellant contended that there were actually
two changes in the road surface; from a prime to a hardened surface and from a hardened to a loose
gravel surface. Id. at 2-4. Appellant also argued that warning signs were inadequately placed to only
warn travelers of the first change in the road surface from prime to a hardened surface and not from
the hardened to the loose gravel surface. Id. at 3. Warning signs were located approximately 4,000
feet from the change in road condition from a hardened surface to loose gravel. Id. Appellant argued
that the changes in road surface and the inadequate placement of warning signs were proximate
causes of the accident. Id. at 4. The Appellant did not define "prime" or "hardened surface."
However, the Appellee, Hulstrand Construction Company, defined "prime" as a loose gravel surface
which has been covered with an oil primer. Brief of Appellee at 2-3, Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co.,
521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994) (No. 940047). According to Hulstrand, the road surface changed from
asphalt to prime to loose gravel. Id. at 1-3. Hulstrand further claimed that warning signs were placed
where the road surface changed from prime to loose gravel. Id. at 3.
7. Appellant's Brief at 2, Bulman (No. 940047). The winter suspension period began on
November 19, 1991, and ended on an unspecified date in the spring of 1992. Appellee's Brief at 2-4,
Bulman (No. 940047).
8. Appellant's Brief at 1, Bulman, (No. 940047).
9. Bulman v. Hustrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632,633-34 (N.D. 1994).
10. Id. at 634. Bulman appealed both summary judgment dismissals of the State of North Dakota
and of Hulstrand Construction Company. Appellant's Brief at 1, Bulman, (No. 940047).
11. The North Dakota Supreme Court was comprised of Chief Justice Gerald W. VandeWalle,
and Justices Beryl J. Levine, William A. Neumann, Dale V. Sandstrom and Bert L. Wilson (sitting in
place of Justice Herbert L. Meschke, disqualified). Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 639.
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I1. LEGAL HISTORY
A. ENGLISH ORIGIN AND AMERICAN ADOPTION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity has its origin in
the medieval English traditions of the 13th century 14 and is often associ-
ated with the maxim "the king can do no wrong."15 Actually, this
adage did not mean that the king was privileged to do wrong, but rather
that the courts lacked jurisdiction over him absent his consent. 16 How-
ever, the king was still politically and morally obligated to follow the law
upon which his authority rested.17
Although it was the king's prerogative to refuse his consent to
being sued, such consent was routinely given upon a showing of a prima
facie legal claim. 18 Procedurally, an injured party would present a
"petition of right" to the king, then the king, or his council, could
consent by directing the petition to a tribunal where the action would be
litigated. 19 As the king's powers were transferred to the state during the
16th century, the king's prerogative evolved into the government's
sovereign immunity. 20
Although early American legal practitioners were well acquainted
with English common-law, including the doctrine of sovereign immuni-
ty, 21 and did not permit states to be impleaded without their consent, 22
14. 9 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 9-10 (3rd ed. 1926). It is believed that the
concept of the sovereign's immunity from suit in his own court dates back to at least the time of King
Henry III (1216-72). Id. at 8.
15. 3 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462 (3rd ed. 1923). For a comprehensive
analysis of the origin, judicial development, and criticisms of sovereign immunity and its purported
basis within the North Dakota Constitution, see William R. Hart, Note, Sovereign Immunity: An
Outdated Doctrine Faces Demise in a Changing Judicial Arena, 69 N.D. L. R EV. 401 (1993) (arguing
that the State's sovereign immunity for tort is unjust and should be judicially abrogated).
16. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 462. In Old English Law it was believed "[tihe king can do
wrong; he can break the law; he is below the law, though he is below no man and below no court of
law." 1 FREDRICK POLLOCK & FREDRICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISToRY OF E NGLISH LAW 515-16 (2d ed.
1968) (1895).
17. Ludwick Ehlrich, Proceedings Against The Crown (1216-1377), in OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 70 (Sir Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921).
18. 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 15; CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 6 (1972). A prima facie legal claim constitutes a legal claim "so far as can be
judged from the first disclosure." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "prima
facie").
19. Ehlrich, supra note 17. at 21-23. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 14, at 13-22 (providing a
history of the petition of right).
20. Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 301 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. 1973) (Nix, J., dissenting),
overruled by Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978); 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 14, at 15-16.
21. JACOBS, supra note 18, at 7.
22. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 362-63 (1788) (denying a claim against
Pennsylvania). In Sparhawk, the Pennsylvania Board of War, acting pursuant to a Congressional
resolution which required the Board to prevent articles which might have been useful to the British
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they apparently did not adopt the procedural remedy of the "petition of
right" for uncertain reasons. 23 Although applied, it was not until 1834
in United States v. Clarke24 that the United States Supreme Court ex-
pressly confirmed in obiter dictum that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity applied to both federal and state governments.25
Whether the drafters of the United States Constitution intended the
doctrine of sovereign immunity to apply to our democratic form of
government is not certain. 26 During the state conventions for the ratifi-
cation of the United States Constitution, there was considerable disagree-
ment as to whether Article 11127 would allow states to be sued in federal
courts, whether consenting or not. 28 Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia29 interpreted Article III as
granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits instituted against states,
whether consenting or not, by citizens of other states or foreign na-
from falling into their hands, seized and moved Sparhawk's flour to a depot located outside of
Philadelphia for safe storage. Id. at 357-58. The depot was subsequently seized by the British. Id.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held for the Commonwealth and stated that had the seizure not
occurred during time of war, the state would have been liable for trespass. Id. at 362. However,
Pennsylvania's Attorney General cited to William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England
in stating "that a sovereign is not amenable in any court unless by his own consent." Id. at 359; see
also JACOBS, supra note 18, at 13 (discussing Nathan v. Virginia, 1 DalI. 77 (Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia, 1784) which denied a claim against Virginia). In Nathan, property belonging to the state
of Virginia was confiscated under a foreign attachment in Philadelphia. Nathan, I U.S. (I Dali.) at 77.
Virginia's congressional delegates argued that this violated the laws of nations and infringed upon the
state of Virginia's sovereignty. Id. at 77-79. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas upheld
Virginia's claim of immunity. Id. at 80.
23. JACOBS, supra note 18, at 6-8. To what extent the English procedural remedies were
transferred to the colonies is uncertain since colonial records have not yet been comprehensively
studied. Id. at 6-7. How the doctrine of sovereign immunity came to be adopted in the United States is
a legal mystery. Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1,4 (1924).
24. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834).
25. United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 445 (1834). "Obiter dictum" is defined as "an
opinion entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1072 (6th ed.
1990).
26. JACOBS. supra note 18, at 40. As stated by Alexander Hamilton,
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government
of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must be
merely ideal.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides in
relevant part: "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity ... between a State
and Citizens of another State ... and between a State ... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id.
28. JACOBS, supra note 18, at 27-40. Some advocates for ratification of the United States
Constitution, including James Wilson and Edmund Randolph, had interpreted Article III as making
states suable in federal courts by individuals. Id. at 28, 39. However. Federalists James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton, along with John Marshall, argued that individuals could not sue a state without
the state's consent. Id. at 39. Others called for an amendment to expressly restrict the power of the
federal courts with respect to suits instituted against the states. Id. at 28.
29. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
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tions.30 This interpretation of Article III appeared to have expressly
abrogated the government's sovereign immunity. 3 1 However, the
Chisholm decision led to immediate and considerable pressure upon
Congress for the passage of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798 from
states fearing that the Supreme Court would compel the repayment of
debt accrued during the Revolutionary war. 32 The passage of the
Eleventh Amendment effectively immunized unconsenting states from
litigation instituted by citizens of other states and foreign nations in
federal courts. 33 The state's immunity from suits instituted by its own
citizens in federal courts was not confirmed by the United States Su-
preme Court as being based in the Eleventh Amendment until 1890 in
Hans v. Louisiana.34
Although Eleventh Amendment immunity is distinct from
common-law sovereign immunity in that Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty is granted through a constitutional provision,3 5 several states, including
North Dakota, have maintained that their state constitutions have elevated
the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity to a constitutional
status. 36
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ITS PURPORTED BASIS WITHIN
ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION
Just as the state government's immunity from suit in federal courts
had obtained a basis within the United States Constitution, 37 North
Dakota's sovereign immunity from suit in state court also purportedly
30. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,420-24 (1793).
31. PETER H. SCHUCK, SuING GOVERNMENT 35-36 (1983).
32. JACOBS, supra note 18, at 67-68. It has been suggested that the Eleventh Amendment
received little opposition because the state legislators that framed the United States Constitution had
intended the states to be immune from suits instituted by individuals. Id.
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (providing that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
34. See 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (determining that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution also precludes federal courts from hearing suits against states commenced or prosecuted
by citizens of that state).
35. SHEPARD'S, CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENT, ITS DIVISIONS, AGENCIES AND
OFICERS 169-70 (1982). The immunity provided through the Eleventh Amendment is distinct from
common-law state sovereign immunity in that the former "shield[s] state governmental functions from
intrusion by the federal government via the federal judiciary," while the latter "prohibit[s] both courts
and plaintiffs from interfering in governmental affairs." Id.
36. See infra note 42 and accompanying text for a list of states which at some time interpreted
their respective state constitutions as having elevated the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity
to a constitutional status.
37. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (providing relevant text of U.S. CONST. amend. XI
for states' immunity to suit in federal courts unless consented to); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21
(1890) (stating that states may not be impleaded in federal courts without the state's consent).
1995]
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obtained a basis within the North Dakota Constitution's Declaration of
Rights.38 Article I, section 9 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy
by due process of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
state in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the
legislative assembly may, by law, direct.39
Adopted in 1889, the North Dakota Constitution is a conglomera-
tion of provisions which were drafted while numerous other state consti-
tutions were taken into consideration. 40 Although the origin of article I,
section 9 has been credited to "constitutions generally," 4 1 it is also
argued that article I, section 9 was derived from a nearly identical
Pennsylvania constitutional provision.42
38. Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524, 534 (N.D. 1924).
39. N.D. CONST. alt. I, § 9.
40. See generally Justice Herbert L. Meschke & Larry Spears, Model Constitution (Peddrick
Draft #2, 1889), 65 N.D. L. REV. 415, 481-90 (1989) [hereinafter Meschke & Spears] (providing a
partial list of authorities for what is purported to be one of three draft constitutions examined by North
Dakota's constitutional draftors at the 1889 North Dakota Constitutional Convention).
41. See id. at 481 (citing article III, section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution as the basis for
the modem article I, section 9).
42. See, e.g., Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 261-62 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J.,
dissenting) (stating that North Dakota's "open courts" declaration contained in article I, section 9 "can
be traced back to 1790 when Pennsylvania ... adopted a provision identical in wording"); Hartd, supra
note 15, at 414 (providing a history of article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution). Article I,
section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted in 1790 and contains nearly identical language
as North Dakota's article I, section 9 and provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such
manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.
PA. CO ST. art. I, § 11. In Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court determined that this constitutional provision did not elevate the common-law doctrine
of sovereign immunity to a constitutional status, but rather granted the state legislature the authority to
choose the cases in which the state would be immune. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388
A.2d 709, 716-17 (Pa. 1978). The court stated that the second sentence was neutral in that it neither
required nor prohibited the state's sovereign immunity. Id. (citing Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Bd., 301 A.2d 849, 854 (Pa. 1973) (Nix, J., joined by Roberts, J., dissenting), overruled by
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 388 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1978). The court noted that its prior
decisions which maintained that this constitutional provision compelled the state's sovereign immunity
were "errors of history, logic and policy" and went on to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 719. However, numerous other states also have similar constitutional provisions. States which
have constitutional provisions similar to North Dakota's include: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See ALAsKA CONST. art. II, § 21 (providing that "[tihe legislature shall establish procedures
for suits against the State"); ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 18 (providing that "[t]he Legislature shall
direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the State"); CAL. CONST.
art. 3, § 5 (providing that "[s]uits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as
shall be directed by law"); CONN. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (providing that "[c]laims against the state shall be
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The first sentence of article I, section 9 has been labeled the "open
courts" clause and grants all individuals the right to redress and remedy
resolved in such manner as may be provided by law"); DEL. CONST. art. I. § 9 (providing in part that
"[a]ll courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him ... shall have remedy by the due
course of law .. .without sale, denial, or unreasonable delay or expense [and that] [s]uits may be
brought against the State, according to such regulations as shall be made by law"); FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 13 (providing that "[p]rovision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to
all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating"); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, $ IX (providing in relevant
part that "[t]he General Assembly may waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit ... by law");
IND. CONST. art. 4, § 24 (providing that "[p]rovision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit
against the State; but no special law authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to
any person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed"); KY. CoNsT. § 231 (providing
that "[tihe General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits may be
brought against the Commonwealth"); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 22 (providing that "[t]he state may sue
and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in what manner and in what courts suits shall be
brought"); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 22 (providing that "[pirovision may be made by general law for
bringing suit against the State as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution");
N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 18(b) (providing that "[t]he legislature may provide for the manner of trial of
actions and proceedings involving claims against the state"); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (providing that
"[aill courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial
or delay ... [and that] [sluits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as
may be provided by law"); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (providing that "[p]rovision may be made by
general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution; but no special act authorizeing (sic) such suit to be brought, or
making compensation to any person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed"); PA.
CONST. art. I, § I I (providing that "[aIll courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay [and that] [s]uits may be brought against the Commonwealth
in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct"); S.C. CONST.
art. XVII, § 2 (providing that "[t]he General Assembly may direct, by law, in what manner claims
against the State may be established and adjusted"); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 27 (providing that "[the
Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the
state"); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (providing that "[tihat all courts shall be open; and every man, for
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
fight and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay [and that] [s]uits may be brought against
the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may be law direct"); WASH. CONST. art.
2, § 26 (providing that "[t]he legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits
may be brought against the state"); WIS. CoNsT. art. 4, § 27 (providing that "[t]he legislature shall
direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state"); WYo. CoNsr.
art. 1, § 8 (providing that "[a]ll courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person,
reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be
brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct").
This compilation of similar constitutional provisions and their text are provided in Brief of Appellee
State of North Dakota at A-I to A-5, Bulman v. Hustrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994)
(No. 940047). At least three of these states, Arkansas, Wisconsin, and Kentucky, had interpreted their
constitutional provisions prior to North Dakota's adoption of article I, section 9. Brief of Appellee
State of North Dakota, at 12-13, Bulman (No. 940047). All three states interpreted their constitutional
provisions as granting to the state legislatures the right to direct by law the cases in which the state may
be impleaded. Id. at 13. See Turner v. State, 27 Ark. 337 (1871) (interpreting Arkansas' constitution
as granting to the state legislature the right to direct by law the cases in which the state may be
impleaded); C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. State, 10 N.W. 560 (Wis. 1881) (interpreting Wisconsin's
constitution as granting to the state legislature the right to direct by law the cases in which the state
may be impleaded); Tate v. Salmon, 79 Ky. 540 (1881) (interpreting Kentucky's constitution as
granting to the state legislature the fight to direct by law the cases in which the state may be
impleaded).
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in court. 43 In contrast, the second sentence has been interpreted as
limiting the right granted by the first sentence by granting to the state
legislature the sole authority to waive or modify the State's sovereign
immunity.44 This interpretation of the second sentence by the North
Dakota Supreme Court has been the basis of recent criticism. 45
C. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN NORTH
DAKOTA
1. Sovereign Versus Governmental Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine which precludes
litigation against an unconsenting government. 46 Prior to 1974, the
North Dakota Supreme Court did not differentiate between "sovereign
immunity" and "governmental immunity" and used the terms inter-
changeably. 47 In 1974, the Court determined that the language of article
I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution only prohibited suits
against the State, but did not preclude suits against the State's governing
bodies. 48 Therefore, a distinction between the governmental immunity
of the State's governing bodies other than the State and the sovereign
immunity of the State itself was required. 49 Despite having statutorily
43. See, e.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 435 (N.D. 1991) (discussing the "open
courts" clause of article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution).
44. E.g., id. at 434. The North Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted the second sentence as
granting to the state legislature alone the authority to waive or modify the State's sovereign immunity
in the following cases: Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 434 (N.D. 1991); Schloesser v. Larson,
458 N.W.2d 257, 258-59 (N.D. 1990); Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead. 425 N.W.2d 906. 908
(N.D. 1988); Patch v. Sebelius, 320 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1982); Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc.,
320 N.W.2d 507, 508 (N.D. 1982); Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 800 (N.D. 1974);
Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675. 679 (N.D. 1971); Spielman v. State. 91 N.W.2d 627, 630 (N.D.
1958); Dunham Lumber Co. v. Gresz, 295 N.W. 500. 502 (N.D. 1940); Shafer v. Lowe, 210 N.W.
501.503 (N.D. 1926); Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524,534 (N.D. 1924). The legislative,judicial, and
executive branches of government are coequal, "and each branch is supreme in its own sphere."
Riverview Place, Inc. v. Cass County, 448 N.W.2d 635, 638 n.3 (N.D. 1989) (quoting State ex rel.
Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392, 394 (N.D. 1987)). See N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 26 (stating that the
state's three branches of government are coequal). When the three branches of a state's government
are created by a constitutional provision, it is implied that each is excluded from exercising the
functions of the others. Riverview Place, 448 N.W.2d at 638 n.3. Great restraint is exercised by the
judiciary when it is asked to impinge upon the functions of the other branches of government. Id.
45. See Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431, 437-38 (N.D. 1991) (Meschke, J., dissenting);
Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 261-63 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke, J., dissenting); Dickinson Pub.
Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead. 425 N.W.2d 906, 910-14 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, J., concurring) (promoting
judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity); Hartl, supra note 15, at 416-21.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B (1979); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed.
1990).
47. See Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675, 676 (N.D. 1971) (claiming governmental immunity on
behalf of the State of North Dakota).
48. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795,800-01 (N.D. 1974).
49. Id. at 800-01. See SHEPARD'S, supra note 35, § 2.1 (1982) (stating that numerous states
differentiate between the state's sovereign immunity and the governmental immunity afforded to the
state's political subdivisions). Governmental bodies have been defined to include counties, townships,
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waived its sovereign immunity in some contexts,50 North Dakota has
retained its sovereign immunity for tort.
2. Judicial Interpretation of Article I, Section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution as a Basis for the State's Sovereign
Immunity
Although prior cases addressed the government's liability for tort,51
the first case in North Dakota to address the State's sovereign immunity
and its basis within the North Dakota Constitution was Wirtz v. Nestos.52
In Wirtz, the court interpreted the North Dakota Constitution as preclud-
ing suits against the State unless such suits were provided for by statute.53
The State's sovereign immunity for tort was established in 1958 in
Spielman v. State.54 In Spielman, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
cities, park districts, school districts, and other local political or governmental subdivisions. Leadbetter
v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431,434 (N.D. 1991). Although sovereign and governmental immunity protects
the respective governmental body from liability for the torts committed by their respective agents and
employees, such agents and employees may still be subject to personal liability for their own tortious
conduct. SHEPARD'S, supra note 35, § 2.23. It is a general principal of agency law that the principal's
immunity does not insulate the agent from personal liability for the agent's tortious conduct. Id.
However, state agents and employees may be absolved of personal liability if the state is the actual
party in interest to the action. Id. See Kristensen v. Strinden. 343 N.W.2d 67, 74, 78 (N.D. 1983)
(dismissing suit after determining that the State was the real party in interest). In addition, a state
public official may be entitled to official immunity for the performance of an official duty within the
scope of the public official's authority. SHEPARD'S, supra note 35, § 6.3.
50. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 06-09-27 (Supp. 1995) (authorizing civil actions against the Bank of
North Dakota); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-22.1 (1991) (providing a three-year statute of limitations on
the commencement of an action against the state); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-22 (1991) (providing that
the state is liable for costs as are private parties); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09.1-02 (Supp. 1995)
(authorizing garnishment proceedings against the state by creditors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-02
(Supp. 1995) (authorizing actions against the state which involve title to property or arising upon
contract); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-04 (1976), amended by 1995 N.D. Laws Ch. 329, § 6
(authorizing warrants to be issued upon final judgment against the state).
51. See Vail v. Town of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092, 1096 (N.D. 1894) (holding a quasi-municipal
corporation not liable for tort); Larson v. City of Grand Forks, 19 N.W. 414, 416 (1884) (holding a
municipal corporation liable for the negligent maintenance of a street).
52. 200 N.W. 524 (N.D. 1924). In Wirtz, depositors of insolvent banks brought suit in equity
against the State Depositor's Guarantee Fund Commission to compel the Commission to pay the
insolvent banks amounts necessary to reimburse unsecured depositors. Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W.
524, 525-26 (N.D. 1924). The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the Commission was a
branch of the State's executive department and therefore could not be sued without the State's consent
through legislative enactment. Id. at 531. The court added that to hold the Commission open to suit
would consume its time and funds in litigation. Id. at 534. However, the court also stated that the
Commission could be sued to compel the performance of a non-governmental official or legal duty
and that their decision was not to be interpreted as precluding suits against officials for the redress of
injuries resulting from an arbitrary refusal to perform an official or legal duty. Id.
53. Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524, 534 (N.D. 1924). The North Dakota Supreme Court
interpreted article I, section 22 of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. Article I, section 22 was
renumbered in 1981 as article I, section 9 pursuant to section 46-03-11.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (formerly codified as article I, section 22); N.D. CENT. CODE §
46-03-11.1 (1993) (authorizing the renumbering of constitutional provisions).
54. 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
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that the legislative enactment of a statute which authorized the State to
obtain liability insurance did not constitute a waiver of the State's
sovereign immunity. 55 Again interpreting article I, section 9 of the
North Dakota Constitution, the court stated that "[t]he immunity of the
state from liability for tort is not waived by legislative enactment unless
waiver appears by express provisions of the statute or necessary infer-
ence therefrom."56
Foretelling the fate of governmental immunity, the court in Sher-
moen v. Lindsay57 in 1968 questioned the justifications behind the
government's immunity for tort.58 Although the court upheld the
political subdivision's immunity, it stated that "it is manifestly unfair
that an innocent victim of a tort should be without recourse when the tort
is perpetrated by a governmental agency, employee or agent." 59
Six years after the court's criticism of the government's immunity
for tort in Shermoen, the North Dakota Supreme Court abrogated the
doctrine of governmental immunity for tort in Kitto v. Minot Park
District.60 The court held that the governmental immunity of the State's
55. Spielman v. State, 91 N.W.2d 627,630 (N.D. 1958). The court affirmed this interpretation in
1971 in Wright v. State, by holding that the State's purchase of liability insurance did not amount to a
waiver of its sovereign immunity. Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675, 680 (N.D. 1971).
56. Spielman, 91 N.W.2d at 630.
57. 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1968).
58. Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d 738 (N.D. 1968). The North Dakota Supreme Court listed
three bases of general classifications on which governmental immunity had been preserved, which
include:
(1) The sovereign is immune from suit, which under our system of government would
include the state and political subdivisions of the state who are considered to be
representatives or agencies of the sovereign:
(2) The curious philosophy that it is more expedient that isolated individuals should
suffer than that society in general be inconvenienced; and
(3) That from a practical view of public policy, governments and governmental
agencies will perform their duties more efficiently and effectively if not jeopardized by
the threat of tort liability.
Id. at 742. In Shermoen, a personal injury suit was brought against the Fargo Park District for
negligence. Id. at 740. A ten-year-old boy had been swinging from a rope which was tied to a branch
of a tree located on property under the control of the Fargo Park District. Id. The boy sustained injury
from a fall after he swung over a street and a passing car caught the end of the rope. Id. Although
the Park District was found to be entitled to governmental immunity, the court noted that the
government's ability to obtain indemnity and liability insurance seemed to negate the justifications
supporting the doctrine of governmental immunity. Id. at 742. The court noted that governmental
immunity had been criticized in recent years and that many states had already abrogated it, either
legislatively or judicially. Id. Numerous states had already judicially abrogated governmental
immunity before North Dakota including Arkansas. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See SHEPARD'S, supra note 35 at 23 (providing an
incomplete list of citations to cases in which the governmental immunity of state governing bodies
other than the state have been judicially abrogated).
59. Shermoen, 163 N.W.2d at 742-43.
60. 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). In Kitto, a 12-year-old boy died as a result of a near drowning
in a Minot city park pond. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795,796-97 (N.D. 1974). The boy's
mother brought suit against the city park district alleging that the pond constituted an attractive
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political subdivisions was not constitutionally mandated and therefore
the court was entitled to abrogate the judicial doctrine of governmental
immunity. 61 However, the court noted that unlike governmental immu-
nity, sovereign immunity could only be modified by legislative action as
provided in article I, section 9.62 The court also invited the State Legisla-
ture to follow suit by abolishing sovereign immunity since, like govern-
mental immunity, it was unjust.63
With the legislative response that the court invited in Kitto not
having materialized eight years later, the court again examined whether
they could abrogate sovereign immunity in Senger v. Hulstrand Con-
struction, Inc 64 In Senger, the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to
judicially abrogate sovereign immunity, noting that the legislature's
response to the abrogation of governmental immunity indicated the
state's intention to retain sovereign immunity.65 The court maintained
that article I, section 9 delegates to the legislature alone the power to
modify its amenability to suit.66 However, this interpretation was soon to
draw criticism from within the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Although the court upheld the State's sovereign immunity in
Dickinson Public School District. v. Sanstead,6 7 Justice Meschke openly
rejected the contention that article I, section 9 precluded the judiciary
from abrogating sovereign immunity and called for its judicial abroga-
tion. 68  Despite the majority's continued upholding of the State's
nuisance. Id. at 797. See SHEPARD'S. supra note 35, § 2.7 (providing a list of cases in which states
have judicially abrogated governmental immunity, updated as of November of 1989).
61. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 801.
62. id. at 803.
63. Id. The court stated that "[t]he matter of sovereign immunity of the state itself .... is one on
which we would solicit legislative action." Id.
64. 320 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1982). The plaintiff brought suit against the State and Hulstrand
Construction alleging that the plaintiff suffered injuries in a head-on collision due to the defendant's
alleged negligence in failing to adequately maintain the construction site and warn travelers of the
hazardous road conditions. Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1982). The
plaintiff argued that North Dakota's article I, section 9 did not expressly prohibit the judiciary from
abrogating the judicial doctrine of sovereign immunity on its own. id. at 508-09.
65. Id. at 510. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that section 32-12.1-03 (4) of the North
Dakota Century Code provided that the state did not waive or abrogate its sovereign immunity by
authorizing the state and the state's governing bodies to obtain insurance coverage within the chapter.
Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(4) (Supp. 1993).
66. Senger, 320 N.W.2d at 510.
67. 425 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 1988).
68. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 910-11 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, J.,
concurring). Although not a tort action, Sanstead was the first case in which a Supreme Court justice
openly rejected the contention that article I, section 9 precluded the judiciary from abrogating
sovereign immunity and called for its judicial abrogation. Id. at 910-11 (Meschke. J., concurring). In
his concurring opinion, Justice Meschke stated that sovereign immunity was a "hallmark of
totalitarianism . . . contrary to our constitution" and was a "discredited doctrine" "of mysterious
origin." Id. at 911 (Meschke, J., concurring). Holding true to form, the majority upheld the State's
sovereign immunity. Id. at 910.
1995]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 71:761
sovereign immunity in Schloesser v. Larson69 and Leadbetter v. Rose,70
Justice Meschke, now joined by Justice Levine, continued to argue that
"sovereign immunity is textually unfounded, lacks historical accuracy,
and is judicially irrational." 7 1
69. 458 N.W.2d 257 (N.D. 1990).
70. 467 N.W.2d 431 (N.D. 1991). Leadbetter v. Rose was the last case in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court barred a tort action against the State. Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 431,
434 (N.D. 1991). In Leadbetter, a student brought suit against the University of North Dakota alleging
a negligent failure to investigate her claim of sexual assault by a Department Chairman. Id. at 432.
The plaintiff argued that sovereign immunity: was a judicial doctrine and could therefore be judicially
abrogated, id. at 434: violates the "open courts" provision of article I, section 9, id. at 435: violates
equal protection, id. at 435-36; and burdens interstate commerce and the plaintiff's right to travel, id.
at 437. In addition, the plaintiff argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution had eliminated the requirement that states must consent to suits instituted by its own
citizens as provided within the Eleventh Amendment. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people . . . to petition the government
for a redress of grievances"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws"). Once again, the court maintained that only the State Legislature may modify the State's
sovereign immunity. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 434. The court also determined that the "open
courts" provision did not guarantee an absolute remedy since the second sentence of article I, section
9 limited the first sentence by leaving the State's sovereign immunity to the Legislature's discretion.
Id. at 435. In response to the equal protection challenge, the Court applied the rational basis test to
find that sovereign immunity was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at 436.
The majority added that sovereign immunity was an equal part of North Dakota's Constitution and
therefore, did not violate other provisions of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 437. The Court did
not address the right to travel or interstate commerce arguments since the plaintiff's case was
unsupported. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that their interpretation of sovereign immunity and the
Eleventh Amendment was consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation in Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 437. See supra notes 27-34 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the history of Article III of the United States Constitution and
the Eleventh Amendment.
71. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke, J., dissenting). In dissent to the majority's
upholding the State's sovereign immunity in Schloesser v. Larson, Justice Meschke, now joined by
Justice Levine, expanded his position as stated in Sanstead by questioning the majority's interpretation
of Wirtz as determining that the second sentence of article I, section 9 provides a constitutional basis
for sovereign immunity. Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 262 (N.D. 1990) (Meschke J.,
dissenting); Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524 (N.D. 1924). Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425
N.W. 2d 906 (N.D. 1988). He noted that Wirtz gave assurances that injured parties could seek redress
and remedy against the State for the arbitrary refusal to perform an official or legal duty. Schloesser,
458 N.W.2d at 262-63 (Meschke, J., dissenting). Justice Meschke also argued that it was not logical to
allow the "subordinate" second sentence to supervene the declared rights granted in the first sentence
of article I, section 9. Id. at 262. In addition, Justice Meschke argued that sovereign immunity
violated equal protection and due process guarantees provided in both federal and state constitutions.
Id. "In a democracy that safeguards individual rights in a constitution, the judiciary cannot be
impotent to rectify private injustices inflicted in the name of public interest." Id. at 263. Again in
Leadbetter, Justice Meschke, joined by Justice Levine, dissented by restating his arguments in
Schloesser that "sovereign immunity is textually unfounded, lacks historical accuracy, and is judicially
irrational." Leadbetter, 647 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke, J., dissenting). Recalling that the court had
invited legislative action in Kitto, Justice Meschke argued that State sovereign immunity was being
upheld on precedent and not reason. Id. Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1974). In
response to the majority's Eleventh Amendment argument. Justice Meschke argued that the Eleventh
Amendment did not enshrine the State's sovereign immunity and that the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply in state courts. Leadbetter, 467 N.W.2d at 438 (Meschke, J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment addresses a states amenability to suit in federal courts. Id. See
also supra note 34 (containing relevant text of U.S. CONST. amend XI).
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III. ANALYSIS
In Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction Co.,72 the North Dakota
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the common-law doctrine
of sovereign immunity had obtained a constitutional basis in article I,
section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution, which could only be waived
or modified by the State Legislature. 73 The court noted that although
the first sentence of article I, section 9 guaranteed access to, but not a
remedy in court, the second sentence had been historically interpreted as
providing a constitutional basis for the doctrine of sovereign immunity
which could only be waived by the State Legislature. 74 Due to recent
questioning of this interpretation, 75 the court reconsidered it by examin-
ing its prior decisions with respect to the State's sovereign immunity, 76
by applying rules of constitutional construction to article I, section 9,77
and by evaluating past justifications for the State's sovereign immunity
for tort.78
The court's examination of the prior decisions began with and
focused primarily on Wirtz v. Nestos.79 The court determined that Wirtz
had been interpreted wrongly in subsequent cases since Wirtz only
prohibited unconsented suits against the State which compelled the State
to perform official duties of a discretionary nature. 80 In Bulman, the
supreme court stated that Wirtz did not preclude, but rather affirmed the
right to redress and remedy against the State "under the fundamental
law of the land." 81
To determine the intent of the people who adopted article I, section
9, the court applied rules of construction to the constitutional provi-
sion. 82 The court determined that the express language of the second
72. 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D. 1994).
73. Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632, 634 (N.D. 1994).
74. Id. See supra note 44 for a complete list of cases in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
has interpreted article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution as providing a constitutional basis
for the doctrine of sovereign immunity which can only be waived by the state legislature.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 (discussing criticisms of the majority's
interpretation of the relationship between the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity and article
I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution).
76. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 634-36.
77. Id. at 636-37.
78. Id. at 638-39.
79. Id. at 634-35. Wirtz v. Nestos, 200 N.W. 524 (N.D. 1924). See supra note 52 (providing a
synopsis of the Wirtz case).
80. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 635.
81. Id. (quoting Wirtz, 200 N.W. at 535).
82. Id. at 636-37. To fulfill the Court's overriding objective of giving effect to the intent and
purpose of article I, section 9's draftors, the Court applied "general principles of statutory
construction, giving effect and meaning to every word, phrase, and sentence and harmonizing, if
possible, potentially conflicting provisions." Id. at 636. See Johnson v. Wells County Water Resource
Board, 410 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1987) (stating that, if possible, a constitutional provision's intent and
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sentence was neutral on its face and therefore did not prohibit suits
against the State or prevent the judiciary from abolishing the common-
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 83 Instead, the court explained, the
second sentence is permissive and "merely authorizes the Legislature to
direct the manner, the courts, and the cases in which suits may be
brought against the State." 84
Next, the court evaluated its past justifications for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which included the English medieval principle that
"the king could do no wrong," 85 the potential retardation of the State's
growth due to the diversion of funds for other governmental purposes, 86
the potential ineffective and inefficient performance of the State's duties
as a result of a possible floodgate of tort litigation, 87 and the expedience
of allowing the individual to suffer, rather than to inconvenience soci-
ety.8 8 The court determined that these justifications were no longer valid
since sovereign immunity perpetuates injustice by prohibiting recovery
solely on the wrongdoer's status, contradicts the tort principle that
liability follow negligence, and is "counterintuitive to any ordinary
person's sense of justice." 89 Furthermore, according to the majority, the
doctrine of stare decisis should not prevent the court from abolishing a
purpose is to be determined from its language).
83. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 637. See supra note 42 (discussing the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's similar interpretation of a nearly identical constitutional provision). The Court noted that a
legal scholar had interpreted identical language in Pennsylvania's constitution as only precluding "suits
in equity" and not "actions at law." Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 637 n.5. See Jerome S. Sloan, Lessons in
Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. Rav. 209 (1978)
(analyzing article I. section II of the Pennsylvania Constitution and its relationship with the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity).
84. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 637.
85. See Shermoen v. Lindsay, 163 N.W.2d 738, 742 (N.D. 1968) (listing historical justifications
for governmental immunity including that the "sovereign is immune from suit").
86. See Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 799 (N.D. 1974) (noting that governmental
immunity had been justified as protecting the development of sparsely populated towns); Vail v. Town
of Amenia, 59 N.W. 1092, 1095 (N.D. 1894) (stating that to hold the town financially liable would
seriously retard its growth).
87. See Watland v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 225 N.W. 812, 814 (N.D.
1929) (stating that sovereign immunity for tort is justified since it would be grievous to require general
taxpayers to pay for an official's negligence and that money raised for specific purposes would be
consumed in liquidation of liabilities); Shafer v. Lowe, 210 N.W. 501,503 (N.D. 1926) (stating that to
hold the state financially liable would impinge upon the public service and safety functions of
government and would interfere with its administration).
88. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 638.
89. Id.
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harsh and outdated doctrine which has no persuasive public policy
justification .90
For these reasons, the court overruled its prior decisions which held
that sovereign immunity had a constitutional basis in article I, section 9,
which could only be waived or modified by the State Legislature. 91 The
court then abrogated the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 92
However, the court placed two limitations on its holding. First, the
State is still immune from tort liability for the performance of official
duties of a discretionary nature, 93 including judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, and quasi-legislative functions. 94 Second, except for the
present case and two others, 95 the court's abrogation of sovereign
90. Id. at 638-39. The Court noted that it had abandoned outdated common-law principles in the
past. See First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware, 429 N.W.2d 5, 10 (N.D. 1988) (abandoning the
common-law principle that a parent may not recover for the loss of a child's society and
companionship); Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 92-93 (N.D. 1988) (abandoning the
common-law principle that parents are limited in recovery to their pecuniary or economic loss for the
wrongful death of their minor child and permitting their recovery for mental anguish, loss of society,
companionship, and comfort); Kitto v. Minot Park District, 224 N.W.2d 795, 804 (N.D. 1974)
(abrogating governmental immunity for governing bodies other than the state); Lembke v. Unke. 171
N.W.2d 837, 847 (N.D. 1969) (abandoning the common-law principle that only heirs, legatees, or next
of kin may waive the physician-patient privilege on behalf of a decedent and determining that to allow
a testator's attending physician to testify as to the testator's testamentary capacity would not violate the
physician-patient privilege since the determination of truth as to the testator's mental capacity was in
the best interests of justice).
91. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 639. See supra note 44 (providing citations to cases which have
interpreted article I, section 9 as granting to the state legislature alone the authority to waive or modify
the State's sovereign immunity).
92. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 639. In abrogating the State's sovereign immunity, the Court stated:
"[w]e conclude that the State's sovereign immunity for tort liability is outdated and is no longer
warranted. We expressly overrule our prior cases sustaining that obsolete doctrine, and we join those
states that have judicially abolished it." Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 640. In Kitto, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that reference to cases involving
the discretionary exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act would provide insight as to what is
considered a discretionary function. Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 804-05. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1972)
(providing discretionary exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act). In 1992, the Court provided
further guidance in determining what constitutes a discretionary function in Richmond v. Haney, 480
N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1992). In Haney, the court noted that under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
conduct in question must involve the judgment of the individual, and such" judgment must 'be
grounded in social, economic, and political policy."' Id. at 759 n.13 (quoting Kinnewick Irrigation
Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing the development of the
discretionary function exception)). The North Dakota Supreme Court has also indicated that a list of
factors contained in section 895D, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a useful
reference in determining what constitutes a discretionary function. Loran v. Iszler, 373 N.W.2d 870,
873 (N.D. 1985). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 895D, cmt. f (1979) (providing a list of
factors to consider in determining whether a public officer's conduct falls under the discretionary
function exception). The Court indicated that relevant factors would be applied on a case by case
basis. Loran, 373 N.W.2d at 874. "Whatever reference or aid we use in determining whether or not
an act is discretionary, it must be utilized with the ultimate purpose behind the discretionary function
exception in mind; that is, the 'essential acts of government decision making [should not] be the
subject of judicial second-guessing."' Haney, 480 N.W.2d at 759 (quoting Kitto, 224 N.W.2d at 804).
94. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 640.
95. The two other cases for which the State's sovereign immunity will not preclude suit are Ferris
v. North Dakota Centennial Comm'n, 521 N.W.2d 643 (N.D. 1994), and Hosman v. North Dakota
State Univ., 521 N.W.2d 643 (N.D. 1994). These two cases were decided contemporaneously with
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immunity would be applied prospectively and would take effect fifteen
days after the Fifty-fourth Legislative Assembly adjourned in order to
give the State legislature an opportunity to obtain liability insurance.96
In a special concurrence, Justice Sandstrom noted that the Declara-
tion of Independence embodies the idea that "government receives its
power from the people, not that people receive their rights from govern-
ment." 97 Therefore, Justice Sandstrom added, although the "legislature
may reasonably regulate suits .... suits cannot be barred based on 'the
immunity of kings."' 98
Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented to what he characterized as the
majority's "sleight of hand" reduction of a constitutional provision to a
common-law doctrine which the majority could set aside as "no longer
meet[ing] the needs of the time." 99 The Chief Justice argued that the
majority's contention that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had been
elevated to a constitutional status through judicial precedent was incor-
rect because sovereign immunity obtained a constitutional status in 1889
when the North Dakota Constitution was adopted by the State Legisla-
ture.100 The Chief Justice stated that irrespective of whether sovereign
immunity had its origins in common-law, it was a part of our constitu-
tion, and should have been afforded the same respect as other constitu-
tional provisions.' 0 l
The Chief Justice also stated that the majority's interpretation of the
second sentence of article I, section 9 as merely authorizing the legisla-
ture to modify or waive sovereign immunity was "indeed a surprise"
because the legislature already had that power.102 Therefore, Chief
Justice VandeWalle concluded, the second sentence was intended to give
Bulman. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 640.
96. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 640. In order for a state's waiver of its sovereign immunity to be
effective, the state must consent to suit and provide funds through appropriation or by taxation with
which to pay a money judgment. Board of Trustees v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 366 A.2d 360, 366 (Md.
1976).
97. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641 (Sandstrom, J., concurring). See supra pp. 2-3 and
accompanying notes (discussing the medieval English origin of the common-law doctrine of sovereign
immunity).
98. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641.
99. Id. (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting).
100. Id. See supra pp. 5-8 and accompanying notes (discussing the adoption of article I, section
9 of the North Dakota Constitution).
101. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641 (VandeWalle, C.J.. dissenting). See, e.g., State v. Rivinius, 328
N.W.2d 220, 228 (N.D. 1982) cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983) (stating that the provisions of a state
constitution have equal standing). In conclusion, Chief Justice VandeWalle attacked Justice
Meschke's previous concurrence in Sanstead in which Justice Meschke stated that sovereign immunity
was a "hallmark of totalitarianism ... contrary to our constitutions" by asking how our constitution
could be contrary to itself. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 642 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). See
Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 (N.D. 1988) (Meschke, J., concurring)
(criticizing sovereign immunity as being unjust).
102. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641-42 (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting).
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immunity to the State.103 Furthermore, Chief Justice VandeWalle stated
that the doctrine of stare decisis should have been given additional
weight in construing the meaning of a constitutional provision.10 4
Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that he personally believed that suits
should be permitted against the State in certain circumstances., 0 5
However, he stated that such a belief does not justify "an unprincipled
judiciary who contrives theories to overrule precedent and set aside
constitutional provisions."106
IV. IMPACT
By abrogating the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has provided injured parties an opportunity to
seek redress and remedy for the tortious conduct of state agents and
employees while continuing to insulate the State from liability for its
officials' performance of duties which are discretionary in nature. 10 7 In
103. Id. Chief Justice VandeWalle stated that the second sentence of article I, section 9 was an
exception to the first and if not for the second sentence, the first sentence would repeal sovereign
immunity. Id. at 642. Chief Justice VandeWalle called the majority's distinction between "suits in
equity" and "actions at law" a flimsy theory since, unlike Pennsylvania, North Dakota had already
abolished the distinction between the two prior to the adoption of the North Dakota Constitution in
1889. Id. See supra note 83 for support of the majority's distinction between "suits in equity" and
"actions at law" argument.
104. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 642 (VandeWalle, CJ., dissenting). See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts §
197 (1965) (stating that stare decisis is of greatest importance when construing a constitutional
provision). In quoting the supreme courts of Montana and Idaho. the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated:
The general rule is that when the highest court of a state has construed a
constitutional provision, the rule of stare decisis . .. applies, unless it is demonstrably
made to appear that the construction manifestly is wrong. Decisions construing the
Constitution should be followed, in the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary, as it is
of the utmost importance that our organic law be of certain meaning and fixed in
interpretation.
Estate of Nystuen v. Nystuen, 80 N.W.2d 671, 684 (N.D. 1956) (Morris, J., concurring specially)
(citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Kain v. Fischl, 20 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Mont. 1933)). The court
also stated:
When the beneficial results to be obtained by a departure from the construction
and interpretation placed by this court upon a constitutional or statutory provision will not
greatly exceed the disastrous and evil effects likely to flow therefrom, the court will
decline to reopen those questions, where rights and interests have become settled under
such decisions, and they have been acquiesced in by the Legislature and the people for
any reasonable period of time.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Walling v. Brown, 76 P. 318 (Idaho 1904)). Chief Justice VandeWalle
noted that the decisions which had held that sovereign immunity was based with article I, section 9
were "neither few in number, obscure, nor ancient." Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 641 (VandeWalle, C.J.,
dissenting).
105. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 642.
106. Id.
107. See Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d 632, 639 (N.D. 1994) (abrogating the
doctrine of sovereign immunity thereby allowing individuals to sue the state of North Dakota for tort);
id. at 640 (retaining the state of North Dakota's immunity for tort for the exercise of official and legal
duties of a discretionary nature). Included within the Court's exception for official discretionary acts
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so doing, North Dakota has joined the majority of states that have
already judicially or legislatively abolished or limited this outdated
doctrine.108 The court's holding does not affect the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal courts, 109 individual immuni-
ties,1 10 or suits instituted against state officials in their personal capaci-
ty.l ll
Since the court delayed the abrogation of sovereign immunity for
all but three cases until fifteen days after the Fifty-fourth Legislative
Assembly adjourned, state legislators were pressed to pass legislation
are judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, and quasi-legislative functions. Id. at 640. See supra note 93
(discussing discretionary functions and legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial acts).
108. Bulman, 521 N.W.2d at 639. States which have already judicially abrogated the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (1963)
(abrogating Arizona's sovereign immunity judicially); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457,
458 (Cal. 1961) (abrogating California's sovereign immunity judicially); Evans v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968,972 (Colo. 197 1) (abrogating Colorado's sovereign immunity judicially); Smith
v. State, 473 P.2d 937,944 (Idaho 1970) (abrogating Idaho's sovereign immunity judicially); Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 98 (II1. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1960) (abrogating Illinois' sovereign immunityjudicially); Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30. 35 (Ind.
1969) (abrogating Indiana's sovereign immunity judicially); Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping
& Enter. Co., 273 So.2d 19, 26 (La. 1973) (abrogating Louisiana's sovereign immunity judicially);
Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W. 2d 597, 603 (Minn. 1975) (abrogating Minnesota's sovereign immunity
judicially); Pruett v. City of Rosedale. 421 So.2d 1046, 1052 (Miss. 1982) (abrogating Mississippi's
sovereign immunity judicially); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 230 (Mo. 1977)
(abrogating Montana's sovereign immunity judicially); Willis v. Department of Conservation &
Economic Dev., 264 A.2d 34, 37 (NJ. 1970) (abrogating New Jersey's sovereign immunity judicially);
Hicks v. State, 544 P.2d 1153, 1155 (N.M. 1975) (abrogating New Mexico's sovereign immunity
judicially); Vanderpool v. State, 672 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Okla. 1983) (abrogating Oklahoma's sovereign
immunity judicially); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Highways, 388 A.2d 709, 720 (Pa. 1978)
(abrogating Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity judicially); McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 742-43
(S.C. 1985) (abrogating South Carolina's sovereign immunity judicially).
109. See N.D. CENT CODE § 32-12.2-10 (providing a statute to preserve the State's Eleventh
Amendment immunity); see also supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
history of Article III of the United States Constitution and Eleventh Amendment immunity.
110. Employees and officers of the State of North Dakota are still entitled to the defense of
statutory immunity for actions which occur within the scope of their employment. N.D. CENT. CODE §
26.1-21-10.1 (1989). State officials are entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 actions. See
Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 191-95 (N.D. 1991) (explaining the requirements of qualified
immunity).
111. The United States Supreme Court clarified the distinction between personal-capacity suits
and official-capacity suits instituted against government officials in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159
(1985):
Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law. Official-capacity suits, in contrast,
'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent.' As long as the government entity receives notice and an
opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the
real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in
his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a
plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look
to the government entity itself.
Id. at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
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which would enable the state to cope with what some have argued will be
a flood of litigation instituted against the State.112
In response to the Bulman decision, the North Dakota Legislature
proposed to reassert the State's sovereign immunity legislatively.11 3 This
would be accomplished by amending article I, section 9 of the North
Dakota Constitution by retaining only the "open courts" clause."l 4 In
addition, the state legislature would then create and enact a new section
to the North Dakota Constitution which would expressly reinstate the
State's sovereign immunity."l 5 These constitutional amendments will
require approval by the North Dakota electorate in 1996.116
In order to address the injustices which spurred the judicial abroga-
tion of the State's sovereign immunity, the Legislature passed laws which
waive the State's sovereign immunity in limited situations. 1' 7 This
legislation provides appropriations for insurance coverage and numerous
limitations including caps on damage awards and notice requirements
for actions instituted against the State.' 18 In any case, by judicially
abrogating the State's sovereign immunity for tort, whether authorized
112. See, e.g., Dale Wetzel, Ruling Opens State Up To Lawsuits, GRAND FORKS H ERALD, Sept. 14,
1994, at 3A (quoting North Dakota Attorney General Heidi Heitkamp as stating that "the ruling may
prompt a deluge of litigation that could cost taxpayers millions of dollars"); see also William E.
Crawford, Torts, 54 LA. L. REV. 807 (1992-93) (arguing that Louisiana should adopt a state tort claims
act to counter a real "threat of financial disaster to the state" as a result of an increase in
appropriations for judgments against the state's transportation department due largely to the
constitutional abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity for tort in 1974 ). But see REPORT OF THE
N.D. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY, at 123 (1987) (indicating that during the
period from 1975 to 1985 there had not been a dramatic increase in civil jury awards as a result of the
abrogation of governmental immunity in 1974 and discussing possible courses of action to deal with an
insurance crisis caused by dramatic increases in the cost of obtaining insurance coverage for the
state's governing bodies, other than the state).
113. S. Con. Res. 4014, 54th Leg., available in ND-LEGIS, West's No. 387. Other states have
legislatively reasserted their sovereign immunity following its judicial abrogation. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.600 (Supp. 1994) (reasserting Missouri's sovereign immunity); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 2310
(Supp. 1995) (reasserting Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity).
114. See S. Con. Res. 4014, 54th Leg., available in ND-LEGIS, West's No. 387 (amending
article I, section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution by deleting the second limiting sentence which
provides "[sluits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as
the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.").
115. Id. (creating and enacting a new section to the North Dakota Constitution). The added
Constitutional provision would provide:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the constitution, no suit may be brought against
the state or an employee of the state acting within the employee's official capacity unless
the legislative assembly provides by law the type of claims and the procedure through
which those claims may be brought against the state or its employees.
Id.
116. See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (providing that the North Dakota Constitution may only be
amended by a majority vote by the North Dakota electors).
117. See S.B. 2080, 54th Leg., 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 329 (creating, amending and reenacting, and
repealing statutes to facilitate the reassertion of the State's sovereign immunity and to waive such
immunity in certain situations).
118. Id.
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to do so or not, the North Dakota Supreme Court has accomplished what
it has been striving to achieve for over twenty years-legislative action to
provide injured parties a remedy against the State for its employees' and
agents' tortious conduct.
Shawn A. Grinolds
